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STORIES OF ScorrsBORO. By James Goodman. New York: Pan-
theon Books. 1994. Pp. xiii, 465. $27.50. 
I. AN INrn.ooucrroN To THE ScorrsBoRo LITIGATION1 
On a chilly morning in March 1931, a score or more teenage 
hoboes boarded a Southern Railroad freight train in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee. Some time later, as the train pulled out of Stevenson, 
Alabama, on its westward journey to Memphis, Tennessee, black 
hoboes and white hoboes got into a fight. The blacks won and 
forced all but one of their white antagonists to alight from the mov-
ing train. The white boys immediately ran back to Stevenson to 
complain to the stationmaster about the blacks and to "press 
charges against 'em."2 The stationmaster called ahead to the Jack-
son County, Alabama, Sheriff in Scottsboro to have the train 
stopped. As luck would have it, the train had just left Scottsboro. 
Undeterred, the Scottsboro Sheriff, M.L. Wann, called ahead to 
Paint Rock, Alabama, and ordered one of his deputies to assemble 
an armed posse to "capture every negro on the train and bring them 
to Scottsboro."3 
When the posse stopped the train, it took nine black youths into 
custody, thus beginning one of the most significant cases in Ameri-
can legal history. It began because, in addition to the nine black 
teenagers, the posse found two young white women on the train. 
After hesitating briefly, the women charged the youths with gang 
rape. The arrested boys were taken from Paint Rock to Scottsboro 
amidst growing public hostility. Confronted by an angry mob, Sher-
iff Wann called the Alabama Governor, Benjamin Meeks Miller, 
who dispatched the National Guard to Scottsboro to prevent the 
enraged citizens from lynching the black hoboes. 
The accused boys were indicted on March 31 and tried on capi-
tal rape charges beginning on April 6, 1931. No counsel agreed to 
represent them until the morning of the first day of the first trial. 
* Professor of Law, DePaul University, College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon College; 
J.D. 1972, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. Unless otherwise noted, the factual material in this introduction is drawn from DAN T. 
CARTER, ScoTISBORo: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN Sourn (rev. ed. 1979) and JAMES 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF ScoTISBORO (1994). 
2. CARTER, supra note 1, at 4. 
3. Id. 
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The lawyers who eventually took the boys' cases were incapable of 
preventing the proceedings from degenerating into travesties of jus-
tice in which prejudice and terror won out over fair consideration of 
the facts. Scottsboro juries condemned all the boys to death, save 
thirteen-year-old Roy Wright. In Wright's case, the jury hung 
eleven to one in favor of the death penalty despite the prosecution's 
specific request for life imprisonment. 
At this point, the Scottsboro trials departed from the pattern 
established in previous Southern interracial rape cases. Lawyers 
from the International Labor Defense (ILD), a Communist Party 
front organization, contacted the boys and eventually became their 
counsel. The ILD and its allies turned the Scottsboro case into a 
cause celebre discussed in newspapers and at rallies across the na-
tion. The ILD lawyers appealed the verdicts in the boys' cases, first 
to the Alabama Supreme Court and later to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The latter heard oral argument in the boys' cases on Octo-
ber 10, 1932. In its precedent-setting decision, Powell v. Alabama, 4 
the Court ruled: 
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion -
the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circum-
stances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveil-
lance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that their 
friends and families were all in other states and communication with 
them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril 
of their lives - we think the failure of the trial court to give them 
reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial 
of due process.5 
The Powell decision was a dramatic departure for the intensely con-
servative Supreme Court of the early 1930s. It marked the begin-
ning of heightened Supreme Court sensitivity to the inequitable 
treatment the criminal justice system accorded African Americans 
and demonstrated the Court's willingness to utilize the Constitution 
to redress palpably unfair criminal trial procedures.6 
The Court returned the Scottsboro case to the Alabama courts 
for retrial. The ILD persuaded one of the finest criminal trial law-
yers of the day, New Yorker Samuel Leibowitz, to represent the 
boys. On March 27, 1933, after a change of venue, the first of the 
retrials began before Judge James E. Horton in Decatur, Alabama. 
Leibowitz vigorously challenged both the exclusion of African 
4. 2frl U.S. 45 (1932). 
5. 2frl U.S. at 71. 
6. To underscore the importance of the Powell decision, Goodman cites an essay by Felix 
Frankfurter in the New York Times in which the Harvard law professor saw in Powell's use of 
the Due Process Clause a "return to [its] more immediate purpose of protecting black men 
from oppressive and unequal treatment by whites." P. 89 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The 
Supreme Court Writes a Chapter on Man's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1932, at El-E2). 
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Americans from the jury and the merits of the State's case. 
Although Judge Horton ultimately overruled the defense challenge 
to the jury system, he found that Leibowitz had established a 
"prima facie" case regarding the exclusion of blacks from the jury. 
At trial Leibowitz brutally attacked the character and credibility of 
one of the alleged rape victims, Victoria Price, focusing especially 
on her lack of chastity and her sexual activity in the forty-eight 
hours before she claimed the boys assaulted her. Leibowitz con-
vincingly demonstrated that a doctor's examination conducted 
shortly after Price made the charges undercut her claims. Leibo-
witz concluded the defense case by calling the second alleged rape 
victim, Ruby Bates, to the stand. She denied that any rape had 
taken place. Despite the defense's strong presentation and in the 
glare of national publicity, the all-white jury convicted defendant 
Haywood Patterson and sentenced him to death. fu June 1933, 
Judge Horton overturned the jury verdict, holding that the prosecu-
tion had not proved Patterson's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and ordered a new trial. 
Judge Horton's ruling incensed the majority of white 
Alabamans. The Alabama Attorney General, Thomas Knight Jr., 
and others worked furiously to remove Judge Horton from the case 
and to try the defendants as speedily as possible. Knight realized 
both of these objectives in October 1933, when Horton withdrew 
and was replaced by Judge William Callahan,-the second judge in 
the Decatur district. Callahan increased the pace of. the litigation 
and sought to thwart the defense counsel at almost every turn. De-
spite the judge's resistance, however, Leibowitz again presented 
substantial proof of jury segregation. At trial Callahan placed a se-
ries of new impediments in the defense's way. He blocked virtually 
all references to Victoria Price's character ~d refused to allow any 
discussion of her sexual conduct in the hours before the rape. The 
latter decision was especially damaging because it prevented the de-
fense from providing any alternative explanation for the semen 
found during Price's medical examination after the alleged assaule 
Without hesitation jurors convicted Haywood Patterson and Clar-
ence Norris, the two Scottsboro defendants brought before them. 
The length and bitterness of the trials, however, led to the post-
ponement of further hearings while Leibowitz appealed these two 
decisions. 
In the aftermath of these trials, the U.S. Supreme Court, for a 
second time, accepted a Scottsboro case for review, Norris v. Ala-
bama. 7 In February 1935, the Court heard Samuel Leibowitz argue 
forcefully that the record clearly demonstrated Alabama's jury seg-
regation and that such segregation was unconstitutional. The pres-
7. 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
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ence of a Jackson County, Alabama, jury roll that had been 
tampered with to make it appear that a small number of black resi-
dents were eligible to serve as jurors bolstered Leibowitz's argu-
ment. On April 1, 1935, the Supreme Court declared that Alabama 
had unlawfully excluded African Americans from its juries and re-
quired Alabama to overturn the Scottsboro convictions.a 
In the face of continuing national scrutiny, the case returned to 
Judge Callahan's , Morgan County courtroom in January 1936. 
Again, Samuel Leibowitz appeared on behalf of Haywood Patter-
son. Again, Judge Callahan sharply curtailed the defendant's case. 
And, again, the jury convicted based on the dubious testimony of 
Victoria Price. The difference was that, for the first time, an Ala-
bama jury fixed a penalty less than death - a seventy-five-year jail 
term. This "loss" shocked the prosecution. It \vithdrew from a set 
of cooperative procedural agreements with ~e defense and, 
thereby, forced another postponement of the proceedings. As the 
angry defendants were being transferred back to jail after the Pat-
terson trial1 defendant Ozie Powell slashed the throat of a deputy 
sheriff. This act set off an uproar in Alabama, where people de-
manded swift punishment for the defendant, and across the nation, 
where many more sympathetic citizens called for an explanation of 
the brutal and suspicious conduct of corrections officials. 
Both sides were wearying of the courtroom contest and constant 
media scrutiny by the end of 1936. In December of that year Prose-
cutor Knight and Leibowitz negotiated an apparent bargain. Be-
cause of Judge Callahan's intractability, however, this deal fell 
apart, and in July 1937, another round of trials began. Alabama 
jurors convicted three defendants of rape, Clarence Norris, Andrew 
Wright, and Charley Weems. Ozie Powell pleaded guilty to assault-
ing the deputy in the throat-slashing incident. Immediately thereaf-
ter, under somewhat mysterious circumstances, the state released 
the remaining four Scottsboro boys - Eugene Williams, Olen 
Montgomery, Willie Roberson, and Roy Wright - without further 
proceedings. The prosecutions came to an end with five boys incar-
cerated and four boys free on precisely the same evidence. In June 
1950, the state paroled the last of the defendants held in an Ala-
bama prison. The defendants had been through eleven jury trials. 
They had been convicted in each trial on the flimsiest of evidence. 
They had been convicted despite overwhelming national criticism, 
representation by one of the best criminal defense lawyers in the 
country, and two favorable decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Although the Scottsboro boys escaped the death penalty, they were 
never able to convince an Alabama jury of their innocence. 
8. 294 U.S. at 599. 
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The Scottsboro saga has had a significant impact on American 
law and history. For Northerners it dramatized one of the most vi-
cious aspects of Southern racism. For Southerners it raised all sorts 
of questions about justice, interracial sex, and the region's relation-
ship to the rest of the nation. The Supreme Court's decisions in 
Powell and Norris were harbingers of a new, more active federal 
judiciary ready to use the Constitution to protect the rights ~f citi-
zens, especially Africail Americans, threatened by gross manifesta-
tions of prejudice. Courts throughout the nation have relied on the 
Scottsboro precedents literally thousands of times since the 
Supreme Court decided them.9 
A huge number of books and articles have been written about 
Scottsboro over the past sixty years.10 The case seems to have be-
come inextricably imbedded in America's historical consciousness. 
It is hard to say why this is so, but the case's story of interracial 
sexual accusations seems to personify both the fears of whites and 
the vulnerability of blacks. The case has served as a rallying point 
for groups with a wide range of different concerns. Susan 
Brownmiller, in her 1975 book, Against Our Will: Men, Women and 
Rape, 11 discusses Scottsboro at length and presents it as a classic 
example of the ways in which the white-male power structure twists 
historical reality to vilify women and retain power. She powerfully 
argues that white men have distorted the case to suggest "that lying, 
scheming white women who cr[y] rape [are] directly responsible for 
the terrible penalties inflicted on black men."12 Brownmiller's 
point has undeniable force especially in light of the apparent misog-
yny of a number of the key participants in the case and her persua-
sive contention that whatever Victoria Price and Ruby Bates did 
was motivated by fear of those men in power-in Jackson County.13 
A strikingly different use of the Scottsboro story can be seen in 
some of the reactions to the 1990 accusations against a group of 
young African Americans concerning the brutal rape and near mur-
der of a white jogger in New York's Central Park. The young men's 
defenders repeatedly asserted, despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, that there had been no rape, that a legal lynching was 
under way and that the Central Park case was another Scottsboro.14 
9. A computerized citation search for the Powell case yielded citations in 3708 cases and 
129 law review articles. A citation search for the Norris case yielded 615 case citations and 32 
law review article citations. 
10. Goodman's bibliography, for example, is ten pages long. Pp. 435-44. 
11. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). 
12. Id. at 230. 
13. Id. at 233-34. 
14. See JoAN DIDION, Sentimental Journeys, in AFmR HENRY 253, 264 (1992). 
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II. STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 
Harvard historian James Goodman has provided us with a 
unique vision of the Scottsboro case in Stories of Scottsboro. It is a 
multi-faceted vision created by including a wide array of perspec-
tives on Scottsboro, ranging from those of the boys, their counsel, 
and their sympathizers on the one side, to their alleged victlln.s, the 
state prosecutors, and the vast majority of white Southern onlook-
ers on the other. As Goodman describes it, the book is 
a history of the court case and controversy, a narrative history in 
which I move, chapter by chapter, from one point of view to another, 
until I have recounted the events on that freight train, at the depot in 
Paint Rock, outside the Scottsboro jail, in and around the Scottsboro 
courthouse, and all over the country in subsequent years from the 
perspectives of a wide range of participants and observers. I answer 
the question "What happened?" with a story about the conflict be-
tween people with different ideas about what happened and different 
ideas about the causes and meaning of what happened - a story 
about the conflict between people with different stories of Scottsboro. 
[p. xii] 
In Goodman's hands, this method of retelling Scottsboro yields a 
series of significant benefits, including the brilliant exegesis of sev-
eral critical events in the case; the creation of vivid portraits of 
many of the participants in the conflict; and the discovery of novel 
insights about the litigation through the examination of previously 
disregarded points of view. Each of these benefits, however, has 
concomitant costs that ought to be noted in assessing the value of 
producing history through the narration of multiple stories. 
One of Goodman's greatest successes is his reconstruction of 
critical moments in the contest by providing a series of overlapping 
views of those moments. This technique lends greater depth and 
life to such episodes than would otherwise be possible. Its value is 
perhaps most apparent with respect to the first series of Scottsboro 
trials, held in April, 1931. Goodman discusses these hearings from 
the widest array of perspectives, starting with those of the bewil-
dered and fearful boys (pp. 3-10). He turns from the defendants to 
the majority of white Alabamans, a group that heard and believed 
ghastly rumors and press reports of the abuses allegedly suffered by 
the victims. From the' white Southern majority point of view, the 
case appeared to be a nightmare of black lust and violence (pp. 11-
18). Goodman moves from the general run of white Southerners to 
the alleged victims, Price and Bates. He deftly sketches the per-
spective of two poor white women stuck on the bottom rung of 
Southern society, powerless outcasts in their own community, 
whose lifestyle drew them perilously close to the public violation of 
sexual taboos that could threaten their safety (pp. 19-23). It is from 
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this vantage point that Goodman starts to try to decipher the mys-
tery of their clearly false accusations. 
Goodman then shifts from the individuals' perspectives to the 
views of three organizations that supported the boys: the Commu-
nists, who, in the wake of the recently concluded agitation over 
Sacco and Vanzetti, saw the case as a prime opportunity for "mass 
education and mobilization" (p. 27); the NAACP, which sought a 
courtroom solution to racial oppression rather than encouraging 
public agitation; and the ACLU, whose Hollace Ransdall gathered 
facts about the women that both revealed their plight and raised 
questions about their morals and the veracity of their statements. 
Goodman then branches out from fairly traditional sources and 
describes the views of less obviously co.nnected parties, including, 
first, members of the Southern black middle class. These blacks felt 
compelled to walk a fine line between publicly condemning any 
suggestion of interracial sexual violence and expressing the most 
profound concerns about the unfairness of the trials. Goodman pri-
marily relies on the stories and reflections of two black newspaper 
editors, Oscar Adams of the Birmingham Reporter and Sol Johnson 
of the Savannah Tribune (pp. 62-66). The recovery of these voices 
and the story of their subtle but unceasing efforts to dramatize the 
problems crystallized by the Scottsboro charges and trials are 
among the most exciting in the book. This section- is followed by an 
equally effective analysis of Northern black intellectuals' views of 
the case. Again, we hear from black editors and writers, including: 
Robert Vann of the Pittsburgh Courier; W.E.B. Du Bois, then writ-
ing for the NAACP journal, Crisis; Robert Abbott of the Chicago 
Defender; and the great poet and novelist Langston Hughes (pp. 67-
73). The richness and variety of these offerings enlivens our think-
ing about Scottsboro and highlights its special meaning for African 
Americans across the nation in the 1930s. 
Goodman expands the picture even further when he tells us 
about Hosea Hudson and Ned Cobb, poor Southern black laborers 
radicalized by the Scottsboro affair and its attendant turmoil. These 
two men joined the Communist Party and chose to dedicate their 
lives to challenging the oppression that Scottsboro came to symbol-
ize for them (pp. 74-82). The boys' parents provide a final black 
perspective on the Scottsboro trials (pp. 82-84). In the end, all 
these views paint a hundred-page portrait of a complex series of 
trials that white Southerners generally prais~d because they 
avoided lynchings, while blacks in all parts of the country as well as 
Northern whites damned them as a travesty governed by overt 
racism. 
The downside to this intensive focus on the first series of trials is 
that it takes up an enormous amount of narrative energy, drawing 
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attention away from later and more protracted aspects of the 
Scottsboro case. Devoting the initial hundred pages of a four-
hundred-page book to the events of the first several months of the 
case leaves proportionally less space for consideration of the events 
of the subsequent six years. Several of these events, most particu-
larly the last set of trials held in 1937 and the failure of the parties 
to abide by the Knight-Leibowitz compromise struck some months 
before, deserve more extended treatment than Goodman accords 
them. The reader of Stories of Scottsboro is left in a quandary 
about why the proposed settlement failed, how the last set of trials 
compared to its predecessors, and why, after five of the boys were 
convicted of various charges, the State of Alabama decided to re-
lease the remaining four boys. Goodman does not analyze carefully 
the anomaly of Alabama's willingness to create two groups, one 
free and one incarcerated, on exactly the same evidence. 
The multiple-story method of exploring major events presents 
another problem as well. It tends to result in an episodic and repe-
titious narrative. As the same events are retold from different per-
spectives, certain information is reiterated virtually verbatim. A 
description of Morgan County Solicitor Wade Wright's closing ar-
gument in the trial held before Judge Horton, Haywood Patterson's 
second trial, is the subject of almost identical descriptions in two 
successive chapters (pp. 133, 143). Discussions of a series of lynch-
ings carried out in 1933 (pp. 204, 210) and descriptions of the back-
grounds of various of the nine defendants are similarly repetitive. 
In each case the information is important, but its repetition detracts 
from the liveliness of the narrative. 
Just as the overlapping perspectives of different actors enable 
Goodman to recreate critical moments in the Scottsboro litigation, 
the overlapping perspectives also facilitate the development of 
compelling portraits of many of those touched by the events of 
Scottsboro. Goodman does an outstanding job in bringing the nine 
boys to life and in breaking this group, so frequently portrayed as a 
single entity, into its human constituents. Goodman invests each 
boy with his own hopes, fears, strengths, and weaknesses. Hay-
wood Patterson is fleshed out as a tough kid who, in jail, grew into a 
hardened convict wise in the ways of prison life and willing to de-
scribe himself as a "devil" (p. 364). He freely admitted keeping a 
"gal-boy" prisoner lover (p. 364), fought other prisoners, resisted 
guards, and generally challenged the system. He was caught at-
tempting to carry a knife into an interview with the Governor of 
Alabama and was eventually classified as an incorrigible offender 
who could never live in society. Yet, he alone among the boys 
planned and carried out a successful escape from an Alabama 
prison that took him to Detroit, where he made a new life, and, in 
cooperation with Earl Conrad, wrote a book about his experiences 
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(p. 380). His story tells us more about prison life in the 1930s and 
1940s South than any scholarly study could. 
Equally moving is the tale of Roy Wright, the youngest of the 
defendants. When Roy was arrested at thirteen, he had virtually no 
idea what was happening in and around the Scottsboro courtroom. 
Deputy sheriffs whipped him until he agreed to testify against the 
other defendants (p. 97). His story is one of constant mistreatment 
from the beginning of his incarceration until his release. He keenly 
felt the passing of his youth as the case dragged on and suffered 
miserably during a year in solitary confinement. He was released in 
1937, after which he went on an ILD fundraising tour of America 
and then to vocational school (pp. 339-40, 354). He :finished his 
education, served in the army, and married. Eventually, he joined 
the merchant marine. In 1959, after returning from a voyage, he 
had a quarrel with his wife; killed her, and committed suicide (p. 
384). Although Wright was arguably the most "normal" of the 
boys, he clearly carried the scars of the Scottsboro experience. 
Goodman's stories bring to life others besides the boys. One of 
the most interesting is a seldom-recognized hero, Allan Knight 
Chalmers (pp. 278-87). Chalmers was among the best and brightest 
of his generation. He was a gifted athlete and scholar. When 
World War I began, he tried to join the U.S. Army and was rejected 
because of a heart murmur. Undeterred, he volunteered to serve in 
the French army. The bloody waste he saw at Verdun led him, after 
the war, to embrace pacifism. In 1922, Chalmers graduated from 
Yale Divinity School and became a minister. He dedicated the re-
mainder of his life to fostering decency, understanding, and peace. 
His was a ministry of social activism. He argued that "[t]o serve 
justice was also to serve love" (p. 280). Wh~n Chalmers became 
acquainted with the facts of the Scottsboro case in 1931, he immedi-
ately entered the fray. He willingly joined forces with anyone inter-
ested in the boys' freedom, no matter what his ideology. In 1935, 
he assembled the Scottsboro Defense Committee in an effort to re-
solve the case. Chalmers persuaded a substantial number of skittish 
Southerners to join in that effort through his commanding presence 
and unimpeachable integrity. Although the boys' antagonists 
thwarted him at virtually every turn, he kept working for the good 
of the boys. His efforts continued long after the case was little 
more than a dim memory to most Americans. Through the 1940s 
Chalmers labored to win the release from prison of the remaining 
Scottsboro defendants. Chalmers was also a steadfast source of en-
couragement and support for the men who had been freed. He was 
the rescuer who, without a thought for himself, strove to help the 
Scottsboro defendants. 
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Despite the general strength of Goodman's portraits, he some-
times appears to allow approbation or antipathy to govern his char-
acterizations. His approval of Hosea Hudson, the black Southern 
iron molder turned communist, is so strong that it begins to have 
the ring of hagiography. All Hudson's activities are made to sound 
noble, all his friends are "comrades," and his enemies are 
"snitches" and worse (p. 76). Goodman here seems to embrace as 
his own the rhetoric of the 1930s left. In addition, Goodman occa-
sionally seems unable to consider dispassionately the attitudes of a 
number of white Southerners involved in the case. His description 
of tJ:ie mental landscape of Wade Wright, the Morgan County Solic-
itor, suggests the nature of the problem: 
Wright - like Callahan, Bailey, and Knight - could no more 
neatly or easily separate the attack on the white youths from the at-
tack on Price and Bates than he could have separated his ideas about 
communism and northern interference from his ideas about white 
supremacy and segregation; his ideas about white supremacy and seg-
regation from his ideas about black women and men; his ideas about 
black women and men from his ideas about white women; his ideas 
about white women from his ideas about rape; his ideas about rape 
from his fear of black women and men; his fear from his hatred and 
his hatred from his fear; and his hatred and his fear from his under-
standing - however ephemeral, mistaken, infinitesimal, unconscious, 
incomplete - of the thoughts and feelings that had to have lurked in 
black minds, of the answer to a common question: How would I feel 
if I were in his skin? [pp. 222-23] 
While this passage evinces a deep emotional connection to the is-
sues in the case, it lacks the helpful balance and sympathetic insight 
found in the great bulk of Stories of Scottsboro. 
The use of a multiplicity of perspectives helps Goodman provide 
a series of novel insights about the case. One of the most striking is 
the way one can fit this story of Southern racist violence into the 
larger historical framework of the 1930s. As Goodman reminds us, 
reports of the 1933 trial of Haywood Patterson ran alongside re-
ports of Hitler's rise to power in Germany (pp. 150-51). Nazi ra-
cism and anti-Semitism were topics of the keenest media attention 
as Morgan County Solicitor Wade Wright exhorted jurors in Deca-
tur not to let "Jew money" buy Southern justice in his closing argu-
ment in Haywood Patterson's second trial, before Judge Horton. 
As Goodman nicely puts it, "one story became an aid to under-
standing the other" (p. 151). Leibowitz eventually accused 
Alabamans of raising "the Hitler cry," and he came to feel not only 
that he was representing the targets of racism but that he was one 
of those targets himself (pp. 151-52). These connections may help 
explain how and why the battle between North and South became 
so sharp in the Scottsboro case, why the Supreme Court decided to 
intervene in the Scottsb.oro litigation twice, and what wellsprings 
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Leibowitz drew upon to find the strength to continue fighting long 
after it appeared victory was beyond his grasp. In a way, Scottsboro 
may have served as an inoculation against the fascism and scientific 
racism that many in the Western world flirted with in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. It was a convenient focus for those who saw the rise of 
Nazism as a danger not only in Germany but in America as well. 
Of course, for Southerners the connection between the Scotts-
boro case and Nazism was far from apparent. A substantial number 
of them perceived the situation as historian Frank Owsley 
presented it at the 1933 annual meeting of the American Historical 
Association in a paper called the "Third Crusade, the sequel to Ab-
olition and Reconstruction" (p. 113). Goodman sketches Owsley's 
thesis as follows: 
In each of the first two crusades .. ·. northern crusaders - not 
authentic crusaders but "sentimental dupes," "hired tools cloaking 
motives of material gain in robes of morality" - had attempted to 
ride the Trojan horse of Negro rights into the South in order to gain 
power for themselves at the expense of white and black people alike. 
In each instance, northeastern industrialists and their intellectual al-
lies had used the Negro as a pawn to further their own political and 
economic ends. In each instance, the northerners' great mistake -
interfering with the relationship between blacks and whites in the 
South - developed into war upon the South. In each instance, the 
North's pillaging of the South in the guise of a moral campaign re-
sulted in the worsening of relations between whites and blacks. After 
abolitionism began, southerners were forced 'to defend and tighten an 
institution they had previously considered abolishing. After redemp-
tion, whites retaliated against black men and women for their conduct 
during Reconstruction. [p. 113] 
Viewed from this perspective, Scottsboro and the Communist cam-
paign against Southern justice could be construed as a third con-
certed assault by the North on the South after the abolitionist 
movement and Reconstruction. Arguably, the previous crusades 
had taught the South the necessity of resisting Northern pressures 
and preserving its way of life. 
While such an interpretation of the history of the Civil War may 
not have been embraced wholeheartedly outside the South, the 
"crusade" hypothesis about Reconstruction and its aftermath had 
become widely accepted by the 1930s. Goodman demonstrates this 
by tracing the shift in historical and popular thinking about Recon-
struction during the early twentieth century (pp.105-110). The con-
ceptual transformation of the post-Civil War era into an heroic 
white struggle for survival may be linked to the efforts of a group of 
scholars associated with Columbia University. Their leaders were 
political scientist John Burgess and historian William Dunning (pp. 
107-08). Their ideas entered the popular mainstream in 1905 when 
Thomas Dixon published his wildly successful novel, The Clansman. 
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The ascendence of this interpretation of events was assured in 1914 
when D~W. Griffith, in collaboration with Dixon, produced his clas-
sic film, Birth of a Nation. The film was not only a popular success 
but persuaded millions of Americans that the rise of the Klan in the 
Reconstruction South was essential to the salvation of white 
Southerners. President Woodrow Wilson screened the film at the 
White House and reportedly remarked that Griffith's work was 
"like writing history with lightning ... and my only regret is that it 
is all so terribly true" (p. 108). 
Most Americans missed the racist implications of a view that 
endorsed Ku Klux Klan violence and the oppression of newly freed 
black citizens. As Goodman forcefully notes, such observations 
were left to a small group of black politicians, historians, and think-
ers, including John Roy Lynch, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Carter G. 
Woodson (pp. 158-60). As Du Bois wrote in the last chapter of his 
1935 volume, Black Reconstruction in America:1s 
Three-fourths of the testimony against the Negro in Reconstruc-
tion is on the unsupported evidence of men who hated and despised 
Negroes and regarded it as loyalty to blood, patriotism to country, 
and filial tribute to the fathers to lie, steal or kill in order to discredit 
these black folk[ ] ... One fact and one alone explains the attitude of 
most recent writers towards Reconstruction[;] they cannot conceive 
Negroes as men; in their minds the word "Negro" connotes "inferi-
ority" and "stupidity" lightened only by unreasoning gayety and 
humor.16 
Goodman's careful tracing of this story not only provides a convinc-
ing intellectual context for Southern views of Scottsboro; it under-
scores the value and impact of the work of historians as well as the 
serious consequences of the revision of historical thinking. 
The development of new perspectives like those involving the 
rise of Nazism and the revision of Reconstruction history are 
among the outstanding intellectual achievements of Goodman's 
work and make the book a feast of new insights. Goodman's intel-
lectual energy flags, however, when he turns his attention to more 
traditional aspects of the case. Scottsboro, for all its social implica-
tions, was a set of legal proceedings in a court of law. One of the 
perspectives that deserves careful scrutiny is the legal one. It is 
here that Goodman's storytelling needs enrichment. The Supreme 
Court decision in Norris v. Alabama17 broke new ground. It sig-
naled, for the first time in decades, the federal courts' willingness to 
15. W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK REcoNsmucnoN IN AMERICA (Frank Cass & Co. 1966) 
(1935). 
16. P. 160 (quoting Du Bois, supra note 15, at 725-26). 
17. 294 U.S. 5fr7 (1935). 
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insist upon the equality of minority citizens.18 African Americans 
across the country celebrated the outcome of the case (pp. 248-50). 
How the Court reached its decision is one of the most interesting 
questicins in the history of Scottsboro. Yet Goodman pays scant 
attention to this matter from the perspective either of the lawyers 
who framed the issues or of the eight Justices19 who decided it. 
Norris was clearly a triumph for Samuel Leibowitz. From the 
outset of his involvement in the case, Leibowitz worked to create a 
record that would prove the absolute exclusion of blacks from Ala-
bama juries. He began to build his record at the pretrial hearing 
before Judge Horton in March 1933. At that hearing he attacked 
the composition of the Jackson County (Scottsboro) jury pool. He 
called the editor of the Scottsboro newspaper, James Stockton Ben-
son, and the President of the Board of Jury Commissioners, J.E. 
Moody. Through careful and tenacious questioning, he was able to 
demonstrate that no black citizens had sat on a Scottsboro jury in 
modem memory and that their participation had not even been 
considered.20 Leibowitz did not leave his proof at this. He took 
what his biographer, Quentin Reynolds, claims was the unprece-
dented step of calling to the stand nine black Jackson County citi-
zens to demonstrate that there were African Americans in the 
community fully qualified to sit on juries.21 Here one glimpses the 
fine hand of a skilled trial lawyer creating a record infused with the 
words and presence of living exhibits that contradicted the State's 
claims about qualifications and availability. In addition, Norris 
demonstrates the extraordinary courage of the black citizens of 
Jackson and Morgan counties who stepped forward and testified on 
behalf of their right to be jurors. Leibowitz artfully orchestrated 
the presentation, but it was their courage that made it possible. 
In the face of Leibowitz's powerful proof, Attorney General 
Knight shifted the nature of the State's defense of its jury system. 
Knight stopped arguing that there were no qualified black juror 
prospects and instead asserted that there was no proof that all 
blacks had been excluded from the rolls (p. 123). Leibowitz dog-
gedly pressed the attack by demanding production of the jury rolls. 
Although Horton overruled Leibowitz's motion, Leibowitz pressed 
18. For earlier evidence of somewhat similar concerns, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause guarantees an impartial court, free from 
hysteria and mob spirit); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating a grandfa-
ther clause that exempted from literacy test all persons and their descendants who had been 
entitled to vote prior to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
19. Mr. Justice McReynolds recused himself from the case. 294 U.S. at 599. 
20. See CAR'IER, supra note 1, at 194-96. 
21. See QUENTIN REYNOLDS, CoURTROoM: THE STORY OF SAMUEL S. LEIBOWITZ 263 
(1950). Although Reynolds states that Leibowitz called a dozen black witnesses, Carter and 
Goodman both fix the number called from Jackson County at nine. P. 121; CAR'IER, supra 
note 1, at 198. • 
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forward. After a one-day recess, he began presenting proof about 
the exclusion of blacks from the Morgan County (Decatur and envi-
rons) jury pool. Leibowitz again interrogated jury commissioners 
and this time succeeded in persuading the judge to have the jury 
rolls produced. Leibowitz then presented twelve prospective black 
jurors eminently qualified to sit. Eventually, Horton overruled 
Leibowitz's second jury challenge but found that the defense had 
made a prima facie case of exclusion (p. 124). 
This painstakingly assembled record was incorporated into the 
first trial held before Judge William Callahan in January 1936 (p. 
216). Callahan ruled that on the basis of the record presented, 
there was no unlawful exclusion of blacks from the jury rolls of 
Morgan County. Reversing Judge Horton's ruling, Judge Callahan 
called for the production of the Jackson County jury rolls. This was 
·a curious, perhaps even suspicious, decision for a staunch supporter 
of the prosecution to have made. Whether Callahan had been in-
formed that the records would help the State is impossible to deter-
mine. J.E. Moody, who had previously testified, appeared with the 
Jackson County jury rolls. Leibowitz forced him to read the rolls, 
entry by entry, to prove that there were no black enrollees. Even-
tually, to everyone's apparent surprise, it was discovered that there 
were at least ten blacks listed on the rolls. Oddly, the names of all 
the potential black jurors were written just above or touching a red 
line drawn by a county clerk to denote the completion of the roll in 
each county precinct. Leibowitz suspected forgery and produced 
expert testimony to prove it.22 Despite the presentation of a power-
ful defense case, Callahan rejected Leibowitz's motion concerning 
exclusion. 
When Leibowitz argued Norris before the Supreme Court, he 
vigorously pressed not only the exclusion claim but also the asser-
tion that there had been deliberate forgery on the jury rolls. Chief 
Justice Hughes challenged him to prove the forgery, and Leibowitz 
responded by presenting the Decatur rolls and a magnifying glass to 
the court. In an unprecedented step, the eight Justices examined 
the exhibit.23 The fact of the forgery figured prominently in Chief 
Justice Hughes's opinion in Norris.24 None of this would have hap-
pened if Leibowitz had done a less effective job in proving de facto 
discrimination or less keenly pressed the attack in Decatur. Such 
tales about legal art and tenacity are worth telling and are curiously 
muted in Stories of Scottsboro. 
22. CARTER, supra note 1at281-83. 
23. See REYNou:is, supra note 21, at 293. 
24. See 294 U.S. at 592-93. Chief Justice Hughes specifically noted, "The books contain-
ing the jury roll in question were produced on the argument at this bar and were examined by 
the Court" 294 U.S. at 593 n.1. 
May 1995] History's Stories 1753 
Similarly puzzling is Goodman's reluctance to explore the give-
and-take within the Supreme Court that led to a unanimous deci-
sion in Norris. Goodman only notes that immediately after releas-
ing Norris the Court decided Grovey v. Townsend,25 a case allowing 
the Texas Democratic Party to exclude blacks from membership. 
Goodman quotes William Pickens of the NAACP, who suggested 
that Norris may have been a consolation prize to African Ameri-
cans as the Court was about to ratify their exclusion from the polit-
ical process (pp. 252-53). This brief observation opens the door to a 
host of broader questions about the attitudes of the men who sat on 
the Supreme Court in 1935, their opinions about race, their views of 
the role of the Supreme Court, and the place of the Scottsboro case 
in their thinking. Much has been written about the lives of these 
men, their judicial philosophies, and their work as judges.26 This 
body of scholarship deserved Goodman's scrutiny. In passing it up 
he ignored one of Scottsboro's most interesting stories. 
Goodman's work suffers because he fails to consider other his-
torical legal information as well. Recent scholarship has reminded 
us that even the greatest defense lawyer of the early twentieth cen-
tury, Clarence Darrow, was, apparently, not above jury tampering 
and the suborning of perjury. Geoffrey Cowan, in a volume enti-
tled The People v. Clarence Darrow, 27 has explored in great detail 
Darrow's near brush with conviction for attempting to bribe two 
jurors in the 1911 case of the McNamara brothers, union leaders 
accused of bombing the Los Angeles Times building during a bitter 
strike. Cowan concludes that Darrow was guilty of the charges 
against him, as well as other misdeeds involving witnesses, and only 
escaped a bribery conviction because of jury sympathy.28 The 
McNamara case was not the only cause celebre touched by this sort 
of scandal. In the Sacco-Vanzettz'29 case,· the prosecution and de-
fense exchanged bitter charges about an alleged bribery scheme 
that was to involve the payment of $50,000 to the prosecutors in 
exchange for the fixing of the case by the selection of corrupt ju-
rors.30 The case of the Italian anarchists was also marred by the 
knowing efforts of both sides to offer witnesses who provided dis-
torted or perjured testimony. One of the State's firearms experts, 
25. 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
26. On Chief Justice Hughes alone there are a substantial number of books and articles. 
See, e.g., SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARI.Es EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME CoURT (1951); 
MERLO J. PusEY, CHARI.Es EVANS HUGHES (1951); Peter G. Fish, William Howard Taft and 
Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SuP. Cr. 
REv. 123; Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 4 (1967). 
27. GEOFFREY CowAN, THE PEOPLE v. CLARENCE DARROW (1993). 
28. Id. at 434-35. 
29. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (1926). 
30. See FRANCIS RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM 118-21 (1962). 
1754 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1739 
Captain William Proctor, charged that the prosecution had coached 
him to give misleading testimony.31 
McNamara, Sacco-Vanzetti, and similar cases provide a useful 
framework into which to fit the virtually endless string of perjury 
and witness-tampering charges made during the Scottsboro litiga-
tion. It was not simply that overzealous prosecution and defense 
attorneys were trying to strengthen their cases when they secreted 
witnesses, paid them, offered material inducements to get them to 
change their testimony, or explored the offers of intermediaries to 
fix the case (pp. 103, 127-28, 139-40). Rather, this all seemed to 
reflect the morality of a rough-and-tumble era far different from 
our own. Goodman's analysis of these events would have been sub-
stantially enriched by recognition of this background. 
III. STORIES, HISTORY, AND THE CAUSE CELEBRE 
Goodman's work reminds us of the importance that historical 
narratives can have and, in turn, the potential influence of the his-
torians who fashion those narratives. Stories of Scottsboro also 
demonstrates that a remarkably influential constituent of historical 
narratives in recent western history has been the legal cause celebre. 
No society lives without the stories it calls history. Historical 
narratives lend social institutions legitimacy and coherence by pro-
viding an explanation of the origins and rationale for present policy. 
A society's stories can be beneficial or calamitously damaging. In 
his brilliant analysis of the origins and growth of the white Southern 
Reconstruction story that portrayed Southern whites as victims of a 
Northern crusade, James Goodman provides a fine example of the 
evolution of a dangerous historical tale. As noted supra, a group of 
historians connected with Columbia University played a critical 
part in the development of this narrative.32 While they were not 
the first to suggest that white Southerners acting through organiza-
tions like the Ku Klux Klan were justified in seizing power to de-
fend themselves against the depredations of Northern 
"carpetbaggers" and unruly ex-slaves, their scholarly work lent 
these claims a credibility they had never before enjoyed. Almost 
immediately after the historians articulated their thesis, Dixon's 
novel and Griffith's film took it up and popularized it. 
This example underscores both the potential influence of the 
tales we tell about history and the importance of the historians who 
fashion and document the tales. The way a society remembers and 
explains its past can profoundly affect its present attitudes and ac-
31. See G. Loms JouGHIN & EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SAcco AND VAN-
ZETTI 128 (1948) (reproducing Proctor's affidavit). 
32. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
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tions. In Alabama in the 1930s, the Reconstruction story seemed to 
provide a template for political action for many whites. As in the 
Reconstruction era, the South had to resist outside agitators, some-
times by force. It had to keep blacks in their place, again by force if 
necessary. Finally, the South had to view the North as a hostile 
entity intent upon undermining order and peace for its own venal 
ends. Self-protective violence, including lynching, was legitimate in 
light of the threat of another Reconstruction invasion - albeit by 
communists rather than Union troops. 
As the Scottsboro case demonstrates, history's raw material in-
cludes dramatic legal proceedings. The tales a society tells about 
great trials can help identify the central conflicts of an era. Critical 
cases often involve a clash between governing authority and those 
who would consciously challenge it. In such proceedings, those in 
control often seem willing to ignore fair play in order to suppress a 
perceived threat. Yet, often, at least in democracies, the opposition 
is powerful enough to challenge this behavior, and the rulers are 
uncertain enough of themselves to have second thoughts about 
their chosen course of action. Out of the ensuing clash of forces, 
both narrowly forensic and broadly social, a set of lessons, or a 
story, may emerge that leads to a reordering of the legal process or 
even of relations in the society as a whole.33 
In British legal history, the seventeenth century was crowded 
with such ·cases. Among the earliest was the case of Sir Walter 
Raleigh, who was condemned in the courts of James I for allegedly 
plotting against the King.34 The evidence consisted of the flimsiest 
sort of hearsay.35 Despite his repeated requests, the judge never 
allowed Raleigh to confront his accuser. The English public viewed 
Raleigh's eventual execution as unjust and opponents of absolute 
monarchy used the trial to attack the one-sided nature of royal jus-
tice. Dramatic courtroom confrontations continued and by the end 
of the century came to epitomize the struggle between the increas-
ingly authoritarian Stuarts and their increasingly obdurate oppo-
nents. Austin Scott argued that the Revolution of 1689 began not 
33. E.P. Thompson saw the potential in such clashes for the extension of the rule of law. 
See E.P. THOMPSON, Wmos AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK Acr (1975). 
34. Raleigh's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 1 (1603). 
35. Raleigh was convicted and executed on the strength of two pieces of he.arsay: first, an 
out-of-court accusation by a co-conspirator named Lord Cobham, whom the state refused to 
produce at trial although he was available; second, the following information from a ship's 
pilot named Dyer: 
I came to a merchant's house in Lisbon,. to see a boy that I had there; there came a 
gentleman into the house, and enquiring what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman. 
Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I answered, No, but that I 
hoped he should be so shortly. Nay, saith he, he shall never be crowned; for Don 
Raleigh and Don Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come. 
2 Howell's State Trials at 25. 
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with Parliament's challenge to James II but with the acquittal of 
seven bishops of the Church of England on a charge of seditious 
libel for refusing to obey James's directive that they read his second 
letter of indulgences in their churches.36 The jury refused to convict 
in the bishops' case, and its refusal came to be viewed as an exam-
ple of the middle ranks in English society resisting absolutist tyr-
anny. This case and the tales told about it set the stage for the 
overthrow of the Stuart monarchy and its replacement by a parlia-
mentary democracy.37 
The late 1920s and 1930s were also crowded with cases signaling 
a growing split between the governing authorities and their chal-
lengers. Such cases include not only Sacco-Vanzetti and Scottsboro 
in America, but the Reichstag fire trial in Germany38 and the Mos-
cow Purge trials in the Soviet Union.39 Their nature and connec-
tions will be considered in the next section. Here it suffices to note 
that these cases and, more importantly, the stories told about them, 
had as powerful an impact on their societies as did the Reconstruc-
tion tale in Alabama during the Depression years. 
With these observations about stories, history, and great trials in 
mind, it is worth taking another look at Stories of Scottsboro, a vol-
ume dedicated to scrutinizing a cause celebre. Goodman brings to 
bear all the apparatus of story-conscious history to help explore the 
implications of the case. He persuasively argues that there is no 
single narrative of Scottsboro but a great mass of stories to be told 
and considered. He draws many of these stories together and al-
lows them, as a body, to sketch the reality of the society in which 
the case took place. As Goodman acknowledges in his Introduc-
tion, not all stories are equal, and authorial selection, narration, and 
ordering inevitably guide us in our review of the Scottsboro case. 
While some of Goodman's guidance can be criticized,40 it is never 
arbitrary or frivolous. Goodman strives to provide us with the sto-
ries that illustrate the case's importance, especially with regard to 
rl}.ce relations in America and the struggle for minority rights in the 
South. Goodman does this while successfully laboring to keep sight 
of the human drama of the nine young men trapped at the center of 
the maelstrom. These achievements give the book both moral and 
36. See Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 
HARv. L. REv. 669, 676 (1918). 
37. The prominent Canadian legal historian John Beattie has described the revolutionary 
era as "the heroic age of the English jury, for in the political and constitutional struggles of 
the reigns of Charles II and James II, trial by jury emerged as the principle defense of English 
liberties." J.M. Beattie, London Juries in the 1690s, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 214, 
214 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988). 
38. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
40. See supra Part II. 
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intellectual power. Goodman effectively harnesses the storytelling 
methodology to provide us with a deeper understanding of a critical 
part of our historical inheritance. He demonstrates the value of pe-
riodically revisiting critical moments in our legal history and vindi-
cates the "Tolstoyan" technique of providing many voices to 
explain an event that may be too complex and variegated for a sin-
gle narrative explanation.41 
Although Goodman turns the storytelling methodology into a 
powerful tool, it poses a number of troubling questions. The his-
torians who helped fabricate and validate the Southern white Re-
construction narrative may also be said to have effectively wielded 
the tool of historical narrative. Their influence on or legitimation 
of Southern behavior highlights the risks inherent in the creation of 
tales about society's past. Tue potential impact of historical work 
imposes a substantial burden on historial).s to act thoughtfully and 
resist formulations that justify oppression, condone violence, or ob-
scure past evil. Inescapably, however, historians' attitudes and the 
needs of their era and place will color their efforts. In recent years 
historical theorists have struggled with this point and debated the 
implications of the time- and culture-bound nature of the histo-
rian's endeavor. Hayden White has been a spokesman for those 
who are c<;>nvinced that historical narratives can and will be made 
into whatever society needs at any given moment.42 For White all 
historical work is relative and ought to be judged not by criteria of 
accuracy but by criteria of effectiveness in serving the needs of soci-
ety.43 From this vantage point, historical writing is at its best when 
it helps mobilize society for action.44 These propositions have 
alarmed a substantial number of other historians who believe in the 
existence of a determinate core of truth in historical analysis and 
who see the effectiveness standard as an invitation to unprincipled 
revisionism.4s How to deal with the vital memories or stories that 
are critical to understanding the nature and purposes of society is 
the challenge always faced by the historian and by society as well.46 
41. The image of the storytelling technique as comparable to the method Tolstoy used in 
writing about the Battle of Borodino in War and Peace is drawn from Carlo Ginzburg, Just 
One Witness, in PROBING nm LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION 95 (Saul Friedlander ed., 1992). 
42. See HAYDEN WHITE, THE CoNTENT OF nm FoRM (1987). 
43. HAYDEN WHITE, The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-
Sublimation, in THE CoNTENT OF nm FoRM, supra note 42, at 58; see also Ginzburg, supra 
note 41, at 82. 
44. WHITE, supra note 43, at 80-81 (arguing that if the "bourgeois ideology of realism" is 
to be resisted, we need a history in a nonnarrative mode). 
45. See generally JoYCE APPLEBY ET AL, TEu.ING nm TRUIH ABOUT HISTORY (1994); 
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LooKING INTO nm ABYSS (1994); PROBING nm LIMITS OF 
REPRESENTATION, supra note 41. . 
46. Austria, Germany, France, and Canada have all used criminal statutes in efforts to 
deal with distortions concerning one critical historical event, the Holocaust See DEBORAH 
E. LIPSTADT, DENYING nm HOLOCAUST 219 (1993); Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: 
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IV. A TIME OF TRIALS 
An issue outside James Goodman's purview in Stories of Scotts-
boro but important in understanding the events of the late 1920s 
and 1930s is the remarkable profusion of trials that seemed to play 
a critical role in the major social changes of the time. Four sets of 
trials stand out as particularly remarkable in this era. These are: 
the Massachusetts prosecutions of Sacco and Vanzetti, which 'con-
cluded with their executions in 1927; the Scottsboro trials; the 1933 
trial of those charged by the Nazi regime in Germany with having 
set fire to the Reichstag; and the 1936 Moscow trials of Communist 
Party leaders whom Stalin accused of joining a Trotsky-led conspir-
acy to undermine the government. All became causes celebre, all 
were manipulated by the communists to their political advantage, 
all pitted a central authority in flux against some of its most vocal 
critics, and all significantly affected not only the political landscape 
of the nation where they arose but the world as well. 
Before considering in detail the connections among these cases 
and the light they shed on their era, it may be useful to sketch some 
facts about them. The Sacco-Vanzetti case began in 1920 with a 
payroll robbery in South Braintree, Massachusetts, that left a pay-
master and a guard dead. The State eventually charged Sacco and 
Vanzetti, two immigrant Italian anarchists, with the crime. Their 
trial was conducted in an atmosphere of extreme hostility toward 
radicals, both because of a post-World War I "Red Scare" and a 
wave of anarchist bombings.47 The judge who presided in the case, 
Webster Thayer, was overtly prejudiced against the defendants and 
on a number of occasions gave voice to that prejudice.48 The prose-
cutor, Frederick Katzmann, used virtually every available ploy to 
obtain a conviction. He tried the defendants as much for their radi-
calism and foreignness as for the crime.49 He or other members of 
his staff carefully prepared witnesses to give misleading or false tes-
timony,50 and he impugned the integrity of all the foreign-born wit-
The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz" - and Other - "Lies," 85 MICH. L. REv. 
277 (1986). 
47. See JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 210-15; RussELL, supra note 30, at 83-92. 
48. Judge Thayer reportedly made prejudicial statements to the following individuals, 
among-0thers: Frank P. Sibley ("I'll show them that no long-haired anarchist from California 
can run this court!"); Lois B. Rantoul; George U. Crocker; and Professor James P. Richard-
son ("Did you see what I did with tliose anarchistic bastards the other day. I guess that will 
hold them for a while .... Let them go to the Supreme Court now and see what they can get 
out of them."). JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 147-48. 
49. His cross-examination of the defendants, especially Sacco, was a scurrilous mix of 
charges involving draft evasion, cowardice, and radicalism. Felix Frankfurter discussed its 
objectionability at length. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZElTl 
47-62 (1961). 
50. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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nesses who appeared on behalf of the defendants.51 Although the 
judge's and the prosecutor's manipulative behavior lent the pro-
ceedings the appearance of a sham trial, there was substantial evi-
dence, including eyewitness testimony52 and defense witness 
perjury concerning Sacco's alibi,53 to suggest that at least one of the 
defendants was guilty.54 The jury convicted, and the judge con-
demned the defendants to death. Six years of appeals followed in-
volving substantial allegations of juror misconduct,55 witness 
tampering,56 evidence fabrication,57 and judicial misconduct.58 
Eventually, someone else claimed to have committed the crime.59 
Throughout the proceedings, local immigrant and anarchist groups 
treated the case as a frameup and fought for the defendants. The 
case grew into a cause celebre, however, only in its last two years 
when the international Communist movement and the American 
intellectual community became involved. 
A rebuilt American Communist Party took up the anarchists' 
case in earnest beginning in 1925.60 The Communists mobilized the 
ILD, which would later become centrally involved 1n the Scottsboro 
case, to raise funds for the defense and to attempt to gain control of 
the litigation. Although the anarchists' lawyers rebuffed the ILD's 
two concerted efforts to take the case over, the Communists man-
aged to convert Sacco-Vanzetti into a powerful fund-raising and or-
ganizing vehicle. Supporters established a Communist-inspired 
Sacco-Vanzetti Emergency Committee and held large, sometimes 
turbulent, rallies across the nation.61 In Europe, at about the same 
time, the international Communist movement adopted the case as a 
rallying point. Communist propagandists unceasingly argued that 
the case demonstrated the oppressive nature of capitalism.62 The 
powerful Communist Parties of France and Genn.any were able to 
mobilize much of Europe in support of the defendants. Across the 
continent, the Communists launched a series of public demonstra-
51. See RUSSELL, supra note 30, at 165-74. 
52. See JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 77-81 (noting, however, that identification 
testimony alone was insufficient to convict); RussELL, supra note 30, at 141-57. 
53. See FRANCIS RUSSELL, SACCO AND VANZETII: THE CASE REsOLVED 109-10 {1986). 
54. See RussELL, supra note 30, passim. 
55. See JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 115-17 {describing the misbehavior of the 
jury foreman, Ripley). · 
56. See id. at 126-28 {describing the misbehavior of Captain Proctor); id. at 131-35 
{describing the misbehavior of witnesses Andrews, Pelser, Splaine, and Goodridge). 
57. See id. at 128-31. 
58. See id. at 142-48. 
59. Id. at 137-39 (reporting the confession of Celestino F. Medeiros). 
60. See DAVID FELIX, PROTEST: SAcco-VANZETn AND TIIE INTELLECTUALS 168-69 
{1965). 
61. See JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 254-55. 
62. See FELIX, supra note 60, at 169. 
1760 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1739 
tions.63 Edmund Morgan and Louis Joughin, in their book on the 
Sacco-Vanzetti aff~ir, commented on the international impact of the 
case: "The diplomatic history of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, brief as it 
is, demonstrates how quickly the popular imagination of people in 
other lands can seize upon issues which involve the administration 
of justice .... "64 
The liberal intellectual community in the United States began, 
from 1926 forward, to join the Sacco-Vanzetti agitation. Felix 
Frankfurter, then a professor at Harvard Law School and a long-
time supporter of the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, urged ac-
tion in this direction. In March 1927, Frankfurter published the de-
finitive defense of the anarchists in the Atlantic Monthly.6s 
Frankfurter's essay, which was reproduced almost immediately in 
book form.,66 a Pulitzer Prize-winning 1926 editorial by F. Lauristan 
Bullard in the Boston Herald, 67 and a long 1927 essay by John Dos 
Passos called Facing the Chair68 served as key sources of inspiration 
for the wide array of thinkers, writers, and social activists who came 
together to fight for Sacco and Vanzetti's lives. While they failed to 
save the men, the case bound them together and gave them the first 
intimations of the power of their writing and thinking. David Felix, 
in Sacco-Vanzetti and the Intellectuals, 69 has taken this argument 
even further and suggested that American liberal intellectuals 
transformed the case into a myth about the betrayal of innocence in 
America7o that they used to challenge the entrenched establishment 
and help facilitate their claim to power during the New Deal.71 
The lessons of Sacco-Vanzetti were not lost on those who sought 
control of the Scottsboro case. The ILD, which had grown to ma-
turity in the final years of the Sacco-Vanzetti struggle, seized control 
of Scottsboro at the earliest opportunity. It used the case to raise 
funds and find recruits for the Communist Party all over the United 
States. The party itself redrafted a host of its positions to facilitate 
recruitment among African Americans.12 Dan Carter, in his book, 
63. See id. at 207-08, 229-31. 
64. JouoHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 280. 
65. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC MoN'lllLY, March 1927, 
at 409, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAw AND POLITICS 140 (1939). 
66. FRANKFURTER, supra note 49. 
67. JoUGHIN & MoRGAN, supra note 31, at 248. This editorial is reproduced in FRANK-
FURTER, supra note 49, at 115-18. 
68. See JouGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 31, at 244 (discussing the publication of Dos 
Passos's essay by the Defense Committee). 
69. See FELIX, supra note 60. 
70. Id. at 240. 
71. Id. at 240-49. 
72. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 148-50 (explaining that Communist organizers de-
emphasized party opposition to religion in light of dealings with black churches and shifted 
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Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South, 13 neatly demon-
strates the nature of the Communist approach: 
On May 14, 1931, the Communist Party's Central Committee issued 
its "Organizational Directives on the Scottsboro Case," which out-
lined in detail the tactics to be used. Freedom for the Scottsboro boys 
required the recruitment of thousands of "hitherto politically inactive 
elements or of workers previously following reformist leadership." 
Whenever possible, branches of the various bourgeois-liberal groups 
should be won for permanent affiliation with the ILD or LSNR 
[League of Struggle for Negro Rights]. Whenever these organizations 
refused to join, Party and non-Party sympathizers should "fight 
against the leaders who block the entrance of the organization as a 
whole .... " Ideally, the campaign would lead to LSNR and ILD 
"Neighborhood Committees" on a block-by-block basis in urban 
areas. Eventually, those who joined the local fronts could be brought 
directly into the Party.74 
This expansion strategy was carried out in accordance with Stalin's 
Comintem Executive Committee directive of 1929 announcing the 
"Third Period" in world Communism, in which Communist parties 
were to seize upon issues to foment "demonstrations, strike, and -
ultimately - revolution."75 In Europe, the Communists organized 
mass demonstrations and a propaganda campaign that featured 
speeches by relatives of the Scottsboro defendants.76 
Yet the Scottsboro case posed a dilemma for the Communists. 
Although they controlled the defense, they could not simply sacri-
fice or make martyrs of the boys to further the party's revolutionary 
aims because this would have discredited them in the eyes of the 
wider public they sought to mobilize.77 The Communists pressed 
ahead with mass action but also sought to obtain the best counsel 
and fight the case vigorously in capitalism's courts. A number of 
observers noted the intellectual, and perhaps strategic, inconsis-
tency between the vigorous social agitation program and the court-
room defense.1s Th.ere was, throughout the early years of the case, 
a steady fl.ow of criticism of the Communists for their attempt to 
manipulate the defense to benefit the more general aims of the 
Communist Party.79 This only diminished in 1935 when Stalin di-
rected the worldwide Communist movement to forge a genuine 
common front with all those willing to fight the m_enace of Hitler's 
away from a program calling for a separate black republic in the South to focus on the imme-
diate problems of unemployment and starvation). 
73. CARTER, supra note 1. 
74. Id. at 141. 
75. Id. at 64. 
76. Id. at 172. 
77. Id. at 139. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 251. 
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Nazism.so The Moscow directive led to a sharp shift in policy by the 
American Communist Party. Liberals and leftists of all sorts were 
now welcomed as coequal participants in the defense. This shift 
eventually led to the ascendancy of Allan Knight Chalmers and the 
depoliticization of the case. 
At the same time as Scottsboro was winding its way through the 
American courts, momentous events were afoot in Europe. These 
events, too, were punctuated by several remarkable trials. The first 
took place in September 1933. It involved a group of men the Nazis 
accused of having conspired to bum down the German parliament 
building, the Reichstag. The defendants included a possibly unbal-
anced Dutchman named Marinus van der Lubbe, who had been ar-
rested at the scene of the fire; the leader of the German Communist 
Party, Ernst Torgler; and a group of Bulgarian communist exiles 
living in Berlin, Georgi Dimitrov, Simon Popov, and Vassili 
Tanev.s1 The morning after the fire, February 28, 1933, Adolph 
Hitler promulgated a decree that effectively granted the Nazi Party 
control of the government and authorized the suppression of oppo-
sition parties.82 The speed of the Nazi move and their unflagging 
efforts to use the fire to discredit their mortal enemies, the Commu-
nists, have led many to speculate that the Nazis themselves were 
responsible for the blaze.s3 
On September 21, 1933, the Nazis convened the Reichstag fire 
criminal prosecution. It is clear that the Nazis designed the trial to 
answer worldwide, frequently Communist-orchestrated, criticism of 
Hitler's rise to power and the treatment of his opponents. The 
trial's managers were also consciously attempting to respond to the 
work of a commission of inquiry that had convened in London and 
examined the case: The commission's findings, .delivered one day 
before the start of the German trial, were starkly anti-Nazi.84 It 
80. Id. at 331. 
81. STEPHEN KoCH, DOUBLE LIVES 55-57 (1994). 
82. See INGO MOllER, Hrn.ER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 29 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1987). 
83. Id. at 28; THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL passim (1934). This volume does not have an 
authorial attribution although it was clearly the product of the Communists who organized 
the countertrial in London. It features an introductory chapter by the defendant Georgi 
Dimitrov. But see FRITZ TOBIAS, THE REICHSTAG FIRE (Arnold J. Pomerans trans., G.P. 
Putnam's Sons 1964) (1962) (challenging the claim that the Nazis were responsible for the 
fire and suggesting that van der Lubbe acted alone). 
84. The Commission found: 
(1) That van der Lubbe is not a member but an opponent of the Communist Party; 
That no connection whatever can be traced between the Communist Party and the 
burning of the Reichstag; 
That the accused Torgler, Dimitrov, Popov and Tanev, ought to be regarded not 
merely as innocent of the crime charged but also as not having been concerned with or 
connected in any manner directly or indirectly with the arson of the Reichstag. (2) That 
the documents, the oral evidence and the other material in its possession tend to estab-
lish that van der Lubbe cannot have committed the crime alone. (3) That the examina-
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appears that the Nazis turned to the trial mechanism in the hopes of 
restoring their international credibility and focusing attention on 
the misdeeds of their Communist opponents. The results of the 
trial did not effectively serve these ends. 
The Nazis left as little to chance as possible. They arranged for 
a set of judges whose prior decisions signaled their sympathy with 
the Nazi regime to preside over the trial.85 The defendants' original 
lawyers were pressured to remove themselves and eventually re-
placed by court-appointed counsel with impeccable Nazi creden-
tials.86 The Nazis manipulated press coverage of the trial to 
facilitate the dissemination of their views. The true nature of the 
case was perhaps most clearly revealed when the court, at the pros-
ecution's request, allowed two of the highest-ranking leaders of the 
Nazi Party, Goring and Goebbels, to address the proceedings, as 
the court put it "to express [themselves] under oath concerning ac-
cusations and slanders which have been directed against [them] 
from certain quarters."87 In long speeches the two attacked the 
London commission, excoriated Communism, and laid all responsi-
bility for the fire at the Communists' feet. Because of the weakness 
of the prosecution's case, the trial ended wit;h the acquittal of all but 
van der Lubbe.88 The verdict was a huge propaganda victory for 
the Communists. The Nazis never again turned to a trial as the 
primary means of pursuing their enemies or justifying their actions. 
The fourth dramatic trial of the era was held in Moscow in 
1936.89 There sixteen defendants - including Lev Kamenev and 
Grigori Zinoviev, two of the most powerful leaders of the Soviet 
Union - were put on trial for their lives. Stalin had secured abso-
lute control of the country and was focused on crushing all opposi-
tion within the Communist ranks. His first targets were those on 
the "left"· of the Communist Party who had, in the 1920s, followed 
tion of all the possible means of ingress and egress to or from the Reichstag make it 
highly probable that the incendiaries made use of the subterranean passage leading from 
the Reichstag to the house of the President of the Reichstag; 
That the happening of such a fire at the period in question was of great advantage to 
the National-Socialist party. 
That for these reasons and the others pointed out in the third part of this report 
grave grounds exist for suspecting that the Reichstag was set on fire by or on behalf of 
leading personalities of the National-Socialist Party. 
THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL, supra note 83, at 37. 
85. See MOLI.ER, supra note 82, at 30. 
86. See THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL, supra note 83, at 97. 
87. Id. at 178 (quoting Dr. Wilhelm BUnger, the presiding judge and panel president of 
the Reichstag Fire trial). 
88. Recently Stephen Koch has argued that the trial was not a confrontation between 
Nazis and Communists but part of a conspiracy or collaboration between the two that even-
tually resulted in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. See KoCH, supra note 81, at 100-03. The propa-
ganda reversals suffered by the Nazis raise substantial questions about this hypothesis. 
89. This account of the Moscow purge trial is, unless otherwise noted, based on ROBERT 
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: S:rALIN's PURGE OF THE THIRTIES (rev. ed.1973). 
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Trotsky and argued for immediate collectivization at home and ag-
gressive export of revolution abroad. In early 1934, after the myste-
rious murder of Kirov,9o a prominent and popular Communist 
leader, Stalin's police arrested Kamenev and Zinoviev, among 
others. They were held in custody for twenty months and then put 
on trial, beginning on August 19, 1936. 
The trial took place in a large public hall before an audience of 
citizens - most of whom were, in actuality, agents of the state se-
curity apparatus, the NKVD - foreign correspondents, and diplo-
mats. The presiding judges were all members of the military. All 
the defendants publicly waived the right to counsel. Each of the 
defendants confessed in court91 that he had been responsible for 
the murder of Kirov or had been associated with a "terrorist 
center" directed by Leon Trotsky or both. The judges sentenced all 
the defendants to death - an unprecedented decision regarding 
members of the Communist Party and one that reversed a long-
standing anti-capital-punishment tradition in such situations. 
In contrast to the Reichstag fire case, the world community gen-
erally accepted the Moscow tij.als' legitimacy. A Western jurist who 
viewed the proceedings opined that they had been essentially fair.92 
New York Times's reporter Walter Duranty, a leading member of 
the Western press corps in the Soviet Union, accredited the confes-
sions and the elaborate plot they described.93 The Soviets success-
fully manipulated the trial mechanism to convince the world of the 
seriousness of the threat to the Communist state and the propriety 
of their response. The Communists would eventually use the same 
story to justify the deaths of millions, and years would pass before it 
became clear that huge numbers of victims had been brainwashed 
and tortured into confessing. 
Even the briefest description of these four famous trials suggests 
some of the reasons for their prominence in the 1920s and 1930s. 
First, the international Communist movement, orchestrated in the 
Soviet Union, promoted their notoriety and exploited their political 
potential. Over the course of the early twentieth century, the Com-
munists became exceedingly adept at manipulating trials for propa-
ganda and organizing purposes. The great political gains achieved 
by American Communists because of the Sacco-Vanzetti case fueled 
90. Robert Conquest has hypothesized that Stalin had a hand in Kirov's murder. See id. 
at 71-76. 
91. Ivan Smimov, alone among the defendants, gave only a partial confession. See id. at 
160·61. 
92. Conquest cites a Pravda reference to the "the English jurist Pritt." Id. at 174. One 
can question Pritt's neutrality since he wrote a foreword to the Communist-fashioned THB 
REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL, supra note 83. 
93. See S.J. TAYLOR, STAUN's APOLOGIST: WALTER DuRANTY, THE NEW YoRK TIMES 
MAN IN Moscow (1990): 
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a search for new causes celebres. When Scottsboro came along, the 
Communist Party and ILD were ready to respond and transform 
the case into an international event. Similar exploitative skill was 
apparent in the Communist response to the Reichstag fire charges. 
With striking alacrity, the Communists organized and mounted a 
countertrial in London before a so-called International Judicial In-
vestigations Committee.94 This proceeding concluded before the 
German trial could even begin and, coupled with a vigorous propa-
ganda campaign, denied the Nazis any advantage from their show 
trial. 
These events suggest that the Communists had become so adept 
at the trial "game" that the Moscow trials were a natural and logical 
extension of what had come before. The Soviets were the preemi-
nent manipulators of the trial mechanism and put their skills to 
work in the Moscow cases to lend them an appearance of legiti-
macy. The use of public hearings, in-court confessions, and ample 
press coverage were all calculated strategies to win international 
approbation. The internati()nal community's acceptance of the So-
viet story despite its contradictions and evidentiary weakness 
speaks volumes about the long-term efficacy of the Communist 
propaganda effort. The Soviets would rely on the trial mechanism 
again and again throughout the 1930s, and once more in the early 
1950s, to justify brutal and bloody repression.9s 
The great trials of the 1920s and 1930s involved far more than 
opportunistic Soviet propagandizing. Each case had a vital essence 
all its own, and each served to personify the struggle taking place in 
the society in which it arose. Around the world the old order was 
dying when these cases were tried: America was coming to the end 
of the era of rough-and-tumble capitalism; Germany was being 
swallowed by Nazism as Weimar's fragile democracy crumbled; and 
the Soviet Union was becoming Stalin's totalitarian kingdom. In 
each society the old and new were at war, and these cases encapsu-
lated that conflict. 
In Sacco-Vanzetti, outsider-immigrant radicals faced the en-
trenched power of the state. In this confrontation, onlookers could 
easily visualize a battle between business as usual and its challeng-
ers. Scottsboro fit a similar: mold. Its defendants were outsiders 
who had become the targets. of a weakening but still entrenched 
authority. Proponents of social change could easily convert the de-
fendants' mistreatment into a symbolic representation of the expe-
94. For an extensive description of the Communist role in the countertrial, see KoCH, 
supra note 81, at 97-125 .. 
95. See, e.g., CoNOUEST, supra note 89, at 341-98 (describing a Soviet trial of "Rightists" 
in the late 1930s); KAREL KAPLAN, REPORT ON THE MURDER OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY 
(1990) (describing Soviet-ordered trial and execution of Czech leader Rudolf Slansky). 
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rience of all those marginalized in the Depression-stricken America 
of the early 1930s. Alabama's racism could be tied to the growing 
menace of fascism both at home and abroad. The inflammatory 
prosecutors, the prejudiced judges, and the constant threat of lynch 
mobs provided a powerfully persuasive personification of the oppo-
sition to social reform in America. The case's reality could be ab-
sorbed into a story of great explanatory force and appeal to those 
enmeshed in turbulent times. 
The German political community recognized that the Reichstag 
fire trial was, from its inception, the embodiment of the key con-
flicts of its era. For the Nazis it offered a way to dramatize and 
substantiate their claims about the Communists. For the Commu-
nists it offered a means of demonstrating Nazi treachery and brutal-
ity. The clash of these combatants over the origins of the fire 
perfectly mirrored their tragic struggle within German society. De-
mocracy and decency were dying, and, despite its outcome, the trial 
expressed this unhappy state of affairs. The crude prosecutorial ef-
forts of the Nazis signaled their disrespect for and lack of compre-
hension of the rule of law.96 The trial demonstrated how Nazi rule 
would debase the once proud tradition of German jurisprudence.97 
The case personified the destructive relationship between Commu-
nism and Nazism. It was like a rehearsal for the war to come, two 
contending ideologies squared off in combat. The proceedings were 
an essential touchstone of the times, taken up by the contending 
forces and made to serve as an instrument of propaganda. 
The Moscow trials, by contrast, were remarkable for what they 
did not show. They did not clearly expose Stalin's murderous plans 
for the Soviet Union. Instead, they succeeded in clothing his plans 
in a veneer of justice. Stalin successfully employed the trappings of 
law to camouflage what were, essentially, sham proceedings. What 
is striking is that so much of the world was taken in by the charade. 
Although great trials can personify and reveal, they can also ob-
scure and mislead.· As the world moved toward war and began to 
choose sides, men and women appeared to suspend disbelief. 
While the 1936 trial in Moscow presented clear intimations of the 
evil to come, most of those watching were not prepared to hear the 
news. 
All h~an institutions are imperfect and subject to failure. Tri-
als, judges, and juries, no less than other instruments of governance, 
are vulnerable. In times of social crisis, certain cases may come to 
capture the popular imagination as expressions of the essential di-
lemmas of society. What they are assumed to reveal can foster soci-
96. Hitler is said to have viewed jurists as "complete fools" who were incapable of under-
standing the needs of the state. MOLLER, supra note 82, at 174. 
97. Id. at 27-35. 
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etal understanding or obscure it. In either event, the cases become 
critical social artifacts of their time. In their proceedings and, even 
more significantly, in the reaction to those proceedings, one can 
find substantial clues to the nature of society's struggles. One 
should not see the cases as providing clear answers but rather inti-
mations. Unpacking causes celebres by telling the stories of the 
contending participants and onlookers is a powerful technique to 
facilitate historical insights. James Goodman has helped us sub-
stantially by providing an excellent methodology and application in 
the vitally important Scottsboro case. 
